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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, an increasing number of central banks have become more transparent 
about their objectives, procedures, rationales, models and data. This has stimulated an intensive 
ongoing research about the effects of central bank transparency.1 Most economists agree that 
openness and communication with the public are crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
because they allow the private sector to improve expectations and hence to make better-informed 
decisions (Blinder, 1998). Counterexamples have been provided, with addition of distortions, 
where information disclosure reduces the ability of central banks to strategically use their private 
information, and therefore, greater transparency may not lead to welfare improvement (e.g., 
Sorensen (1991), Faust and Svensson (2001), Jensen (2002), Grüner (2002), Morris and Shin 
(2002)).2 In effect, according to the second best theory, the removal of one distortion may not 
always lead to a more efficient allocation when other distortions are present.  
Typical models on monetary policy transparency usually consider two players, the monetary 
authority and the private sector. Departing from this approach, several authors introduce 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions.3 In a framework where the government sets a 
distortionary tax rate, it was shown that uncertainty (or opacity) about the “political” preference 
parameter of the central bank, i.e. the relative weight assigned to inflation and output gap targets, 
could reduce average inflation as well as inflation and output variability (Hughes Hallett and 
Viegi (2003), Ciccarone et al. (2007), Hefeker and Zimmer (2010)). Higher distortionary taxes 
                                                 
1 Pioneered by Cukierman and Metzler (1986), transparency issue has been examined both theoretically and 
empirically by Nolan and Schaling (1998), Faust and Svensson (2001), Chortareas et al. (2002), Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (2007), among others. See Geraats (2002) and Eijffinger and van der 
Cruijsen (2010) for a survey of the literature.  
2 See Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) for a short survey about these models including distortions.  
3 Some researchers study the relationship between central bank transparency and the institutional design (Walsh, 
2003; Hughes Hallett and Weymark, 2005; Hughes Hallett and Libich, 2006, 2009; Geraats, 2007). 
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necessary for financing higher public expenditures will induce lower output gap and higher 
unemployment. Thus, central bank increases the inflation rate and workers claim higher nominal 
wages. In terms of macroeconomic volatility, less central bank political transparency has a 
disciplining effect on the fiscal authority, which could dominate the direct effect of opacity when 
the government cares less about the public expenditures, and the central bank is quite populist 
whilst the initial degree of central bank opacity is sufficiently high.4  
However, the aforementioned studies do not distinguish the different components of public 
expenditures by separating public consumption (e.g. public sector wages and current public 
spending on goods) from public investment (e.g., infrastructure, health and education). A 
substantial theoretical and empirical research has been directed towards identifying the 
components of public expenditure that have significant effects on economic growth (Barro 
(1990)). The introduction of both public capital (infrastructures) and public services (education) 
as inputs in the production of final goods, theoretical models suggested that public investment 
generates higher growth in the long run through raising private sector productivity (e.g. Futagami 
et al. (1993), Cashin (1995), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Ghosh and Roy (2004), Hassler et 
al. (2007), Klein et al. (2008), Azzimonti et al. (2009)). In addition, empirical studies confirm the 
positive impact of public investment on productivity and output (e.g. Aschauer (1989), Morrison 
and Schwartz (1996), Pereira (2000), and Mittnik and Neuman (2001)).  
Usually, the frameworks used in theoretical studies on public investment ignore the effects 
due to monetary and fiscal interactions. Cavalcanti Ferreira (1999) examines the interaction 
between public investment and inflation tax and has found that the distortionary effect of 
                                                 
4 The term “political transparency” used here corresponds to the information disclosure about the weights assigned 
by the central bank to the output gap and inflation stabilisation. Five motives for central bank transparency (i.e. 
political transparency, economic transparency, procedural transparency, policy transparency and operational 
transparency) are defined in Geraats (2002). 
 4
inflation tax is compensated by the productive effect of public expenditures. Ismihan and Ozkan 
(2004) consider the relationship between central bank independence and productivity-enhancing 
public investment, and argue that although central bank independence delivers lower inflation in 
the short term, it may reduce the scope for productivity-enhancing public investment and so harm 
future growth potential. Ismihan and Ozkan (2007) extend the previous model by taking into 
account the issues of public debt, and have found that, under alternative fiscal rules (balanced-
budget rule, capital borrowing rule), the contribution of public investment to future output plays a 
key role in determining its effects on macroeconomic performance.  
The distinction between public consumption and public investment could allow us to 
introduce in the literature of central bank transparency the effects of public investment on the 
aggregate supply. These effects could correct the distortionary effects of taxation and therefore 
interact with central bank transparency. For this purpose, we re-examine in this paper the 
interaction between central bank political transparency and fiscal policies in a two-period model, 
similar to Ismihan and Ozkan (2004), where the public investment is productivity-enhancing and 
could compensate, partially or totally, the distortions generated by the taxes on revenue. The aim 
of the paper is to investigate to what extent the disciplining effect of opacity could be generalized 
to a framework where the government has more than one policy instrument.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 presents the 
benchmark equilibrium where there is no productivity-enhancing public investment. Section 4 
examines how the inclusion of public investment affects the effects of opacity according to the 
marginal effect of public investment on the aggregate supply. The last section summarizes our 
findings. 
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2. The model  
 
The two-period model of discretionary policy making is similar to the one presented by Ismihan 
and Ozkan (2004). To model the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment on the 
supply, we consider a representative competitive firm, which chooses labor to maximize profits 
by taking price (or inflation rate tπ ), wages (hence expected inflation etπ ), and tax rate ( tτ ) on 
the total revenue of the firm in period t as given, subject to a production technology with 
productivity enhanced by public investment in the previous period ( itg 1− ). The normalized 
output-supply function is: 
i
tt
e
ttt gx 1−+−−= ψτππ ,  2,1=t ;    (1) 
where tx  (in log terms) represents the normalized output (or output gap). Equation (1) captures 
the effects of supply-side fiscal policies on the aggregate supply of output, with the effect of 
distortionary taxes being clearly distinguished from that of public investment.5  
The public expenditures are composed by public sector consumption ( 0>ctg ) and investment 
( 0≥itg ), both expressed as percentages of the output. The public investment consists of 
productivity-enhancing expenditures on infrastructure, health, education etc. However, as its 
favorable consequences indirectly affect the consumers’ utility, this type of expenditure is not 
taken into account in the policy maker’s utility function. On the contrary, public consumption 
made up of public sector wages, current public spending on goods and other government 
spending is assumed to yield immediate utility to the government. The fiscal authority’s loss 
function is 
                                                 
5 The variable τ allows covering a whole range of structural reforms. In effect, τ could also represent non-wage costs 
associated with social security (or job protection legislation), the pressures caused by tax or wage competition on a 
regional basis or the more general effects of supply-side deregulation (Demertzis et al., 2004).  
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where 0E  is an operator of mathematical expectations, Gβ  the government’s discount factor, 1δ  
and 2δ  the weights assigned to the stabilization of inflation and public consumption respectively, 
while the output-gap stabilization is assigned a weight equal to unity.  
The government’s objectives are the stabilization of the inflation rate and the output gap 
around zero, and of the public consumption around its target ctg . The government minimizes the 
above two-period loss function subject to the following budget constraint:  
t
c
t
i
t gg τ=+ ,  with 2,1=t .     (3) 
Equation (3) is a simple form of the budget constraint since public debt and seigniorage revenue 
are not taken into account. Even though itg  enhances the productivity in the future, it is 
implemented and financed in the current period. 
The government delegates the conduct of the monetary policy to the central bank while it 
retains control of its fiscal instruments. The central bank sets its policy in order to minimize the 
loss function 
∑
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CB xL επεμβ , 0>μ ,    (4)     
where CBβ  is the central bank’s discount factor. The parameter μ  is the expected relative weight 
that the central bank assigns to the inflation target and it could be equal or different from 1δ . It is 
therefore an indicator of central bank conservatism (larger μ  values) versus liberalism or 
populism. According to the literature, we assume that the central bank can fully neutralize the 
effects of policy shocks (including public spending) or exogenous demand shocks affecting the 
goods market through appropriate setting of its policy instrument π .   
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The weights assigned by the central bank to the inflation and output-gap targets are more or 
less predictable by the government and private sector, meaning that ε  is a stochastic variable. 
The fact that ε  is associated to both inflation and output objectives is adopted for avoiding the 
arbitrary effects of central bank preference uncertainty on average monetary policy (Beetsma and 
Jensen, 2003). The distribution of ε  is characterized by 0)( =εE , 22 )()var( εσεε == E  and 
],1[ με −∈ . Variance 2εσ  represents the degree of opacity about central bank preferences. When 
02 =εσ , the central bank is completely predictable and hence, completely transparent. As the 
random variable ε  is taking values in a compact set and has an expectation equal to zero, 
Ciccarone et al., (2007) have proved that 2εσ  has an upper bound so that ],0[2 μσε ∈ . 
The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms inflation expectations, 
then, the government sets the tax rate and public investment, and finally the central bank chooses 
the inflation rate. The private sector composed of atomistic agents plays a Nash game against the 
central bank. The government, as Stackelberg leader, plays a Stackelberg game against the 
central bank. The game is solved by backward induction. 
 
3. The benchmark equilibrium without public investment  
 
First, we consider a benchmark case where the public investment has no supply-side effect. 
Therefore, it is optimal for the government to set its level at zero. This benchmark case is drawn 
directly from Hefeker and Zimmer (2010). It is different from Ciccarone et al. (2007) who also 
introduce distortions in the labor market through the wage determination by an all-encompassing 
monopoly union, as well as from Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) who consider a Nash game 
between the fiscal and monetary authorities, both concerned by distortionary taxes.  
 8
Equations (1) and (3) are rewritten as: 
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The central bank minimizes the loss function (4) subject to (5). Its reaction function is:  
  μ
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Equations (5)-(7) allow us to express the output gap as: 
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The government has only one instrument to choose between the tax rate and public 
consumption due to the budget constraint (6). Setting its fiscal policy, the government cannot 
predict (7)-(8) with precision due to imperfect disclosure of information about the central bank 
preferences. Substituting ctg , tπ  and tx  given by (6)-(8), the government’s constrained 
minimization problem is rewritten, after rearranging the terms, as an unconstrained minimization 
problem:     
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Using the second-order Taylor approximation to obtain ][E 2
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the government’s loss function is rewritten as 
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Proposition 1. For given expected inflation and tax rate, an increase in central bank’s opacity 
generally induces higher social welfare loss.  
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As the government has an objective of public consumption, tτ  cannot be fixed in a way to 
completely neutralize the effects of central bank’s opacity in the social loss function. If the 
government sets ett πτ −=  to neutralize the effects of opacity on the social loss function, it will 
suffer from high marginal cost due to insufficient public consumption. Hence, the optimal level 
of the tax rate depends on the degree of opacity. From the first-order condition of the 
government’s minimization problem we obtain:  
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Substituting tτ  given by (11) into (7) and imposing rational expectations yields: 
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Substituting etπ  given by (12) into (11) and taking account of (6) lead to: 
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Using (12)-(13) into (7)-(8) and the budget constraint (6) yields: 
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Calculating the variance of tπ  and tx  results to:  
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From (13)-(17), we observe that the denominator increases as the degree of opacity 2εσ , while 
the numerator of (16) decreases as 2εσ  and the numerator of (17) is increases as 2εσ . It follows 
that tτ , ctg , tπ  and tx  are all decreasing in 2εσ . On the other hand, )var( tπ  and )var( tx  could be 
both increasing or decreasing in 2εσ , as shown by the results of Hefeker and Zimmer (2010) that 
we reformulate in the following proposition.  
Proposition 2. An increase in central bank’s opacity reduces the tax rate, inflation and output 
distortions but increases deviations of public consumption from its target level. It reduces the 
variability of inflation and output gap if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently high and vice 
versa.  
Proof. Deriving tτ , tπ , tx  and  ctct gg −  given by (13)-(16) with respect to 2εσ , leads to the first 
part of Proposition 2. Deriving )var( tπ  and )var( tx  given by (17) with respect to 2εσ , yields: 
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Distortions introduced by taxes used to finance public expenditures imply higher current and 
expected inflation rates. Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle implies that the government is 
incited to adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy (“disciplining effect”) because the perceived 
marginal costs associated with higher taxes are higher under central bank opacity. This stance of 
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fiscal policy leads to lower output gap and inflation rate at the cost of larger deviation of public 
consumption from its target level. In terms of macroeconomic volatility, opacity triggers two 
opposing effects. The first corresponds to the direct effect of opacity on the variability of 
inflation and output gap for a given tax rate (or given level of distortions). The second refers to 
the disciplining effect, since uncertainty about the central bank preference leads to greater fiscal 
discipline, contributing to the reduction of inflation and output volatility. The disciplining effect 
is more likely to dominate the direct effect of opacity if the central bank is less averse to inflation 
(smaller μ ) and the government is less concerned with the public consumption deviations 
(smaller 2δ ).  
Using the property ],0[2 μσε ∈ , shown by Ciccarone et al. (2007), we extend the previous 
results in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. If the government assign a sufficiently high weight to the public consumption, i.e. 
)1(
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2
1
2
1
μμ
δμμδδ + +−+> , the disciplining effect of central bank’s opacity will always be dominated by 
the direct effect of opacity on the variability of inflation and output gap and vice versa.  
Proof. We obtain 022
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∂
∂
∂
εε σσ
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)1(2)1
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μμδδμ
εσ + +++>∀ . According to Ciccarone et al. 
(2007), there exists an upper bound on 2εσ  so that ],0[2 μσε ∈ . Thus, the previous lower bound on 
2εσ  is valid only when μδ μμδδμ <+ +++ )11( )1(2)1
2( . This leads to 
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2(2
δ
μμδδμ
εσ + +++<  . In this 
case, the direct effect of opacity will always dominate the disciplining effect.  ■ 
In the following, we examine the validity of the previous results in the case where the public 
investment is productivity-enhancing. 
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4. Effects of productivity-enhancing public investment    
 
Consider that the public investment is productivity-enhancing. However, according to the 
marginal effect of such investment, the government might be incited to implement positive, zero 
or even negative public investment in period 1 or/and 2. Even though negative public 
investments, such as privatization of infrastructure and education institutions, are possible in 
practice, they cannot be captured in the present model. That is because such disinvestments are 
considered to generate a negative effect on the productivity while the privatization suggests a 
transfer of property but not an inversion of effects of such investments on the productivity. Thus, 
we assume that negative public investments are not allowed. This implies that we must introduce 
two supplementary constraints for the government, i.e. 01 ≥ig  and 02 ≥ig . 
Minimizing the central bank’s loss function (4) subject to the economic constraint (1) yields 
the central bank’s reaction function: 
μ
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1
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t
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Using (1)-(3) and (18), we rewrite the government’s loss function as: 
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Proposition  4. For given tτ , ctg  and itg , if 01 ≠−+ −ittet gψτπ , an increase in central bank’s 
opacity induces a higher social welfare loss. 
Proof. Deriving the loss function given in (19) with respect to 2εσ  and using the definition of Θ , 
we obtain: 0])()([ 21222011)1(2
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Opacity has negative effects on the social welfare. In the absence of productivity-enhancing 
public investment, the government has incentive to reduce the tax rate but at the risk of increasing 
the deviation of public consumption from its target level. In the case of productivity-enhancing 
public investment, when positive interior solutions exist for public investment in two periods, the 
effects of past public investment allow a complete compensation of the distortions introduced by 
the taxes. Thus, the government is enabled to set a tax rate to ensure that the objective of public 
consumption is realized. Since the distortions disappear, the central bank has no incentive to set 
an inflation rate higher than zero. In contrast, the distortions will only be partially compensated 
when such interior solutions do not exist. In the following we consider the case where positive 
interior solutions exist for public investment and two cases of corner solutions.  
 
4.1. The case where positive interior solutions exist for public investment 
This is the case where the public investment is sufficiently productivity-enhancing, such that   
public investments are set optimally by the government at a strictly positive level in two periods. 
The first-order conditions of the minimization problem (19) are: 
0)()( 1112011
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Solving (20)-(23) gives the government’s reaction functions: 
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ie g011 ψπτ +−= ,       (24) 
ieci ggg 0111 ψπ +−−= ,  (25) 
eeci gg 1210
2
2 ψππψψτ −−−= ,  (26) 
eeccii gggg 12210
2
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To determine the expected inflation rates, we substitute 1τ , ig1  and 2τ  respectively, given by 
(24)-(26) into (18). Imposing rational expectations yields: 
021 == ee ππ .         (28) 
Using the results given by (28) into (24)-(27) leads to the equilibrium solutions 
  ig01 ψτ = ,         (29) 
cii ggg 101 −=ψ ,  (30) 
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2
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2
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From (30) and (32), we deduce the minimal value of ψ  for ensuring that the optimal public 
investment is strictly positive in two periods, as follows:  
i
cicc
g
gggg
0
20
2
11
2
4+±>ψ .  
Under this condition, we have simultaneously 01 >ig  and 02 >ig .  
Using (29)-(32) into (3), we get the public consumptions: 
  ct
c
t gg = ,  with  2,1=t .      (33) 
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Compared to the benchmark solution (13), the solutions of tax rate and public consumption given 
by (29), (31) and (33), are extremely simple. They depend only on the initial public investment, 
the marginal effect of public investment and the targets of public consumption.  
Proposition 5. If the public investment is sufficiently productivity-enhancing, i.e. 
i
cicc
g
gggg
0
20
2
11
2
4+±>ψ , the government will optimally set the tax rate and public investment such as  
to neutralize the effects of central bank preferences and hence the effects of opacity on its 
decisions.  
Proof. It follows straightforward from (29)-(33).  ■ 
We remark that the government’s decisions given by (29)-(33) are not dependent on central 
bank preferences. The central bank’s “type” (more or less conservative) has neither effect on the 
tax rate and public investment nor on their variability. Thus, the degree of transparency has no 
impact on these decisions. The introduction of sufficiently productivity-enhancing public 
investment incites the government to increase the tax rate to finance higher investment in period 
1, but not necessarily in period 2. In effect, the government can collect more taxes, given the 
higher productivity in period 2. But, as the benefits of public investment in period 2 will be 
attributed to the next government, the government has no incentive to increase public investment 
in this period. However, the government is not urged to set the public investment in period 2 at 
zero, since the tax rate which neutralizes the distortions could generate more tax revenue than 
what is optimal to spend on the public consumption. The current government is elected on a 
mandate which implies that it should not set a too high public consumption to avoid the 
deterioration of the social welfare. 
We notice that the tax rate and public investment in the two periods do not depend on the 
preferences of fiscal authorities. In effect, when the government, whatever are the government 
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preferences, sets separately the tax rate and public investment, it must ensure that the optimal 
choices allow concealing the effects of these two policy instruments on production and hence 
inflation.  
Using the results given by (28)-(31) into (1) and (18), we obtain: 
021 == ππ ,         (34) 
021 == xx .         (35) 
The above equilibrium solutions show that inflation and output-gap targets of the central bank are 
always realized.  
Proposition 6. If the public investment is sufficiently productivity-enhancing, i.e. 
i
cicc
g
gggg
0
20
2
11
2
4+±>ψ , the optimal choice of tax rate and public investment by the government 
allows the neutralization of the effects of central bank preferences and hence the effects of 
opacity on the level and variability of inflation and output gap.  
Proof.  It follows directly from the solutions given by (34)-(35).   ■  
In contrast to the existing literature on the interaction between fiscal policies and central bank 
transparency, the degree of political transparency in the present case is irrelevant for the 
economic equilibrium and macroeconomic stabilization. This is because the government, which 
has two free policy instruments, is able to conceal the distortionary effects of taxes collected to 
finance the public expenditures through the optimal choice of tax rate and public investment. 
Then, the central bank has no motivation to set an inflation rate higher than the target inflation, 
which is zero. This is rationally expected by the wage setters, thus leading to the elimination of 
the output distortions.  
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Our findings imply that the government could generally neutralize the effects of opacity when 
positive interior solutions exist for tax rates and public investments. There is neither a case 
against, nor a case for more opacity of the central bank. Meanwhile, in contrast to the benchmark 
case, the central bank has no incentive to be more opaque since the disciplining effects of opacity 
have disappeared.  
 
4.2. The cases of corner solutions for public investment 
We now consider two cases of corner solutions. In the first case, the public investment is 
insufficiently productivity-enhancing such that the constraints 01 ≥ig  and 02 ≥ig  are both 
binding. In the second case, it is quite productivity-enhancing such that only the second 
constraint is binding. 
 
Case 1. Public investments are set to zero in two periods 
This is the case where i
c
g
g
0
1<ψ  (or 010 <− ci ggψ ), i.e. the marginal effect of the past investment 
on the current productivity is smaller than the ratio of public consumption target in period 1 over 
public investment in period 0. Because the condition 010 <− ci ggψ  implies that 
0011 <+−= ici ggg ψ  and 02121022 <−=−−= ciccii gggggg ψψψ , the interior solutions of ig1  and 
ig2  are both negative. Taking into account the constraints 0, 21 ≥ii gg , the government sets 
021 == ii gg . This leads to 0
1
>∂
∂
i
G
t
g
L  and 0
2
>∂
∂
i
G
t
g
L , i.e. a decrease in ig1  and 
ig2  will improve the 
social welfare. Using 021 == ii gg  into the first-order conditions (20) and (22), we obtain: 
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Θ+
+−Θ=
2
1210
1
)(
δ
δπψτ
cei gg ,        (36) 
2
222
2 δ
πδτ +Θ
Θ−=
ecg .                   (37) 
Using (36)-(37) in (18) and taking mathematical expectations of the resulting equations yield: 
0
)1(
)(
2
012
1 >+Θ+
−= μμδ
ψδπ
ic
e gg ,         (38) 
0
)1(2
22
2 >+Θ+= μμδ
δπ
c
e g .         (39) 
Using (38)-(39) into (36)-(37) and taking account of (3) and the definition of Θ , results to: 
2
11
2
2
120
2
11
2
2
120
11 )1()()1(
)1(])1()[1(
)1(
)1(
ε
ε
σδδμμμδ
μμδσδδμμψ
μμδ
μδμψτ +++++
++++++=+Θ+
+Θ+==
cici
c ggggg , (40) 
2
11
2
2
22
2
22
22 )1()1(
)1(
)1( εσδδμμμδ
μμδ
μμδ
μδτ +++++
+=+Θ+==
cc
c ggg .              (41) 
Using (1), (3), (18), (38)-(41), 021 == ii gg , and the definition of Θ , we obtain: 
2
11
2
2
012
2
012
1 )1()1(
))(1()1(
)1(
)()1(
εσδδμμμδ
ψμδε
μμδ
ψδεπ +++++
−++=+Θ+
−+=
icic gggg ,    (42) 
2
11
2
2
012
2
012
1 )1()1(
))(1()(
)1(
)()(
εσδδμμμδ
ψμδμε
μμδ
ψδμε
+++++
−+−=+Θ+
−−=
icic ggggx ,   (43) 
2
11
2
2
22
2
22
2 )1()1(
)1()1(
)1(
)1(
εσδδμμμδ
μδε
μμδ
δεπ +++++
++=+Θ+
+=
cc gg ,     (44) 
2
11
2
2
22
2
22
2 )1()1(
)1()(
)1(
)(
εσδδμμμδ
μδμε
μμδ
δμε
+++++
+−=+Θ+
−=
cc ggx .     (45) 
The equilibrium solutions given by (40)-(45) allow us to examine how the economy will behave 
under central bank opacity when the public investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing. 
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Proposition 7. If the public investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
c
g
g
0
1<ψ , the public investments in the two periods are set to zero. Compared to the benchmark 
case, the tax rate and public consumption are higher and the inflation rate and output distortions 
lower in period 1, and their equilibrium values are the same in period 2.   
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from comparing (40)-(45) with (13)-(16).  ■ 
In the present case, even though the government has no incentive to implement a positive 
public investment in periods 1 and 2, the effects of public investment in period 0 allow the 
government to increase the tax rate and public consumption in period 1 while reducing 
distortions. Therefore, the inflation rate and output distortions are both lower in period 1. In 
period 2, as the effects of past investment disappear, the government will behave exactly like in 
the benchmark case. 
Proposition 8a. If the public investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
c
g
g
0
1<ψ , the tax rate and public consumption in period 1 react positively to an increase in opacity 
if i
c
i
c
g
g
g
g
0
1
0
1
)1(
<<+ ψμ , and negatively if i
c
g
g
0
1
)1(
 μψ +< . The inflation rate and output distortions in 
period 1 are negatively affected by an increase in opacity independently of ψ . In period 2, all 
these variables are negatively related to the degree of opacity independently of ψ .  
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from deriving (40)-(45) with respect to 2εσ .  ■ 
The productivity-enhancing effect of public investment in period 0 enables the government to 
increase the tax rate and hence public consumption in period 1. Thus, the disciplining effect of 
opacity in the tax rate and the effect of public investment allow reducing the inflation rate and 
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output distortions. In period 2, since the effect of past public investment disappears, all these 
variables will behave as in the benchmark case. 
Using (42)-(45), the variances of tπ  and tx  are calculated as: 
22
11
2
2
22
012
11 ])1()1([
)])(1([)var()var(
ε
ε
σδδμμμδ
σψμδπ +++++
−+==
ic ggx ,     (46) 
22
11
2
2
22
2
22 ])1()1([
])1([)var()var(
ε
ε
σδδμμμδ
σμδπ +++++
+==
c
tgx .    (47) 
We notice that (47) is the same than (17). 
Proposition 8b. If the public investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
c
g
g
0
1<ψ , an increase in opacity has similar but smaller effects on the variability of inflation and 
output gap in period 1, and identical effects in period 2 compared to the benchmark case. 
Proof. Deriving (46)-(47) with respect to 2εσ  yields: 
32
11
2
2
2
11
2
2
2
012
2
1
2
1
])1()1([
])1()1([)])(1([)var()var(
ε
ε
εε σδδμμμδ
σδδμμμδψμδ
σσ
π
+++++
+−+++−+=∂
∂=∂
∂ ic ggx , 
32
11
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
])1()1([
)]1()1([])1([)var()var(
ε
ε
εε σδδμμμδ
δσδμμμδμδ
σσ
π
+++++
+−++++=∂
∂=∂
∂ ctgx . 
The above derivatives are positive if 
1
1
2
2
1
)1(2
δ
δμμμδ
εσ + +++<  and vice versa. According to the poof of 
Proposition 3, if 
)1(
)()1(
2
1
2
1
μμ
δμμδδ + +−+> , the only possible case is that these derivatives are positive 
due to the upper bound on the initial degree of opacity, i.e. μσε ≤2 .  ■ 
These results are explained by the fact that the past investment weakens the distortionary 
effects of the taxes in period 1 without modifying the mechanism through which the effects of 
opacity are transmitted to the economy. The disciplining effect of opacity dominates the direct 
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effect of opacity on macroeconomic volatility only if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently 
high and the weight assigned by the government to the public consumption sufficiently low. The 
conditions imposed on these parameters are exactly the same as in the benchmark case.    
 
Case 2. Public investment is set to zero only in period 2 
 
This corresponds to the case where the marginal effect of public investment on the productivity is   
at an intermediate level such that i
cicc
i
c
g
gggg
g
g
0
20
2
11
0
1
2
4)( ++<<ψ . This is equivalent to have 
simultaneously 010 >− ci ggψ  and 02102 <−− cci ggg ψψ . Thus, the interior solution of public 
investment in period 1 is positive, i.e.  0101 >−= cii ggg ψ  and that in period 2 is negative, i.e. 
021210
2
2 <−=−−= ciccii gggggg ψψψ . Setting 02 =ig  implies that 0
2
>∂
∂
i
G
t
g
L , i.e. a decrease in ig2  
under zero will improve the social welfare. Using 02 =ig  and the first-order conditions (20)-(22), 
we obtain: 
)1)((
][))((
2
2
22122201
2
2
1 ψβδ
δψδπδψβψπψβδτ
G
cce
G
ie
G ggg
++Θ
+++−Θ+Θ+−=  ,   (48) 
 
)1(
)()(
2
10122
1 ψβ
ψππψβ
G
ciece
Gi gggg +
−−−+= ,        (49) 
)1)((
)(])[(
2
2
121022
2
2
2 ψβδ
ψππψψδψβδτ
G
ceeic
G ggg
++Θ
Θ−Θ−−Θ+++Θ=  .    (50) 
Substituting 1τ , ig1  and 2τ  respectively given by (48)-(50) into (18), we obtain: 
)]1()[1(
)(
2
2
210
2
2
1 μμδψβ
ψψψδβπ +Θ++
++−=
G
cci
Ge ggg , (51) 
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)]1()[1(
)(
2
2
210
2
2
2 μμδψβ
ψψδπ +Θ++
++−=
G
cci
e ggg .  (52) 
Since 0210
2 <−− cci ggg ψψ , we have 0, 21 >ee ππ .  
Substituting the above solutions of  e1π  and e2π  into (48)-(50) yields:  
2
102
1 1 ψβ
ψψβ
G
cic
Gi gggg +
−+= ,         (53) 
)]1()[1(
)()1()1(
2
2
212020
2
1 μμδψβ
ψψμδβψμδψβμψτ +Θ++
+++++Θ=
G
cc
G
ii
G gggg ,    (54) 
 
)]1()[1(
))(1()]1()1([
2
2
102
22
2
2 μμδψβ
ψμψμψβψβμδτ +Θ++
−+Θ++Θ++=
G
cic
GG ggg .    (55) 
Using (3), (53)-(54) and 02 =ig , the public consumption in periods 1 and 2 is: 
)]1()[1(
))(1()]1()1([
2
2
20
2
1
2
2
1 μμδψβ
ψμψβμψβμδ
+Θ++
−+Θ++Θ++=
G
ci
G
c
Gc gggg ,    (56)  
)]1()[1(
))(1()]1()1([
2
2
102
22
2
2 μμδψβ
ψμψμψβψβμδ
+Θ++
−+Θ++Θ++=
G
cic
GGc gggg .    (57) 
Finally, using (1), (18), (51)-(53) and (55), we get the inflation rate and output gap in periods 
1 and 2: 
  
)]1()[1(
)()1(
2
2
210
2
2
1 μμδψβ
ψψψδβεπ +Θ++
++−+=
G
cci
G ggg ,  (58) 
)]1()[1(
)()(
2
2
210
2
2
1 μμδψβ
ψψψδβμε
+Θ++
++−−=
G
cci
G gggx ,      (59) 
 
)]1()[1(
)()1(
2
2
210
2
2
2 μμδψβ
ψψδεπ +Θ++
++−+=
G
cci ggg ,       (60) 
 
)]1()[1(
)()(
2
2
210
2
2
2 μμδψβ
ψψδμε
+Θ++
++−−=
G
cci gggx .       (61) 
 23
Using (58)-(61), the variances of tπ  and tx  are calculated as: 
2
2
2
22
210
2
2
11 })]1()[1({
)]([)var()var( μμδψβ
σψψψδβπ ε+Θ++
++−==
G
cci
G gggx ,     (63) 
2
2
2
22
210
2
2
22 })]1()[1({
)]([)var()var( μμδψβ
σψψδπ ε+Θ++
++−==
G
cci gggx .     (64) 
In the following, we compare the equilibrium solutions given by (53)-(61) with these 
obtained in the first case of the corner solutions (40)-(45)  and with the benchmark solutions (13)-
(15). Furthermore, we compare the macroeconomic volatility obtained in the present case with 
these observed in the benchmark solution (17) and in the first case of the corner solutions (46)-
(47).  
Proposition 9a. If the public investment is relatively productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
cicc
i
c
g
gggg
g
g
0
20
2
11
0
1
2
4)( ++<<ψ , the optimal level of public investment is positive in period 1 and zero 
in period 2. Compared to the benchmark case, the tax rate and public consumption are higher in 
two periods, the inflation rate and output distortions are lower (higher) in period 1 if 
igcci gggg
G
c
0
2
210
2 1 ψψψ ψβ +<<−  (if igc gg G
c
0
2
2
1 ψψβ +> ) while they are always lower in period 2.  
Proof. See Appendix A, part I.  ■ 
In the second case of the corner solutions, a positive public investment is implemented in 
period 1 but not in period 2. Compared to the benchmark case, the government can increase the 
tax rate and public consumption in periods 1 and 2 while reducing distortions due  to the effects 
of public investment in periods 0 and 1. Therefore, the inflation rate and output distortions are 
both lower in period 1 if the public consumption target of period 2 is not too higher. In effect, if 
the latter is too high, the intertemporal trade-off will incite the government to increase the tax rate 
in the way that it can invest more in period 1, leading to higher inflation rate and output 
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distortions in this period. In period 2, as the public investment in period 1 has a positive effect on 
the production in period 2, the government reduces output distortions and this incites the central 
bank to reduce the inflation rate. 
Proposition 9b. Compared to the case where i
c
g
g
0
1<ψ , the tax rate is higher in two periods. The 
public consumption is higher, and the inflation rate and output distortions lower in period 1 only 
if the target of public consumption in period 2 is not too high. The public consumption is higher, 
and the inflation rate and output distortions lower in the period 2.  
Proof. See Appendix A, part II.  ■ 
The second case of the corner solutions is intermediate between the first case (where the 
government does not invest in periods 1 and 2) and the case of the interior solutions (where the 
government has incentive to invest in both periods). The productivity-enhancing effect of past 
investment urges the government to increase the public consumption in period 1, but this effect 
could be dominated by the effect of intertemporal trade-off. More precisely, if the public 
consumption target of period 2 is too high, the government will lower the public consumption in 
period 1 to implement a higher level of public investment allowing it to recover more fiscal 
revenue in the period 2.   
Proposition 10a. If the public investment is relatively productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
cicc
i
c
g
gggg
g
g
0
20
2
11
0
1
2
4)( ++<<ψ  such that the public investment is set to zero only in period 2, the 
public investment in period 1 is not affected by central bank opacity, while the tax rate, public 
consumption, inflation rate and output distortions in two periods are negatively affected by an 
increase in opacity. 
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Proof. It follows straightforwardly from deriving (53)-(61) with respect to 2εσ , taking into 
account that 2
)1(
)1(
)1( 2
1
2
1
2
εμ
δ
μ
δμ σ+
+
+
+ +≈Θ  and 02102 <−− cci ggg ψψ .  ■ 
In the second case of the corner solutions, as in the benchmark case, the disciplining effect of 
opacity on the tax rate allows the reduction of the output distortions and hence of the inflation 
rate. However, public investments are independent of central bank preferences and hence of 
central bank opacity. This is because the public investment allows the reduction of the output 
distortions, and the government has to trade-off between its current consumption and current 
investment, something that affects the future public consumption. Therefore, the choice of public 
investment depends only on the parameter representing the marginal effect of public investment, 
on the supply function and the parameters characterizing the government preferences. 
Proposition 10b. If the public investment is relatively productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
cicc
i
c
g
gggg
g
g
0
20
2
11
0
1
2
4)( ++<<ψ , an increase in opacity has similar but smaller effects on the variability 
of inflation and output gap in period 1 (except when the public consumption target in period 2 is 
too high, i.e. igc gg
G
c
0
2
2
1 ψψβ +> ) and identical effects in period 2, compared to the benchmark.  
Proof. See Appendix B.  ■ 
As discussed above, the public investments in periods 0 and 1 attenuate the distortionary 
effects of the taxes in periods 1 and 2 but do not modify the mechanism through which the effects 
of opacity are transmitted to the economy. As in the benchmark case, an increase in opacity could 
reduce the macroeconomic volatility only when the direct effect of opacity is dominated by the 
fiscal disciplining effect of opacity. This is possible only when the initial degree of opacity is 
sufficiently high and the weight assigned by the government to the public consumption 
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sufficiently low, with the conditions imposed on these parameters being the same as in the 
benchmark case. 
Our findings suggest that when the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, the 
government will have another free policy instrument that can be used efficiently to neutralize the 
distortionary effects of taxes necessary for financing public expenditures. In this case, central 
bank opacity has no effect on the macroeconomic performance and volatility. However, as shown 
by the corner solutions, when the public investment is not sufficiently productivity-enhancing, 
the government cannot use it to completely counterbalance the distortionary effects of taxes. 
Therefore, the level of output distortions and the effects of opacity in the macroeconomic 
performance and volatility will situate between these found in the benchmark case and these in 
the case where the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing.  
The benchmark case suggests that an increase in opacity improves the macroeconomic 
performance by reducing the tax rate, and hence the inflation rate and output distortions through 
the fiscal disciplining effect. It could reduce the macroeconomic volatility when the direct effect 
of opacity is dominated by the fiscal disciplining effect, i.e. if the initial degree of opacity is 
sufficiently high and the weight assigned by the government to the target of public consumption 
low enough. Under these conditions, there is clearly a case for central bank opacity. If the weight 
assigned by the government to the target of public consumption is high enough, then there is a 
trade-off between macroeconomic performance and volatility, because an increase in opacity 
induces lower inflation rate and output distortions but higher macroeconomic volatility. The 
trade-off is cancelled if the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, since the 
government could neutralize the distortionary effects of the taxes. However, when the public 
investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing, the implications of the benchmark case are 
still valid even though the effects of opacity on the macroeconomic performance and volatility 
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could be weakened by the productivity-enhancing effects of public investment in the past and/or 
in period 1.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In a two-period model where productivity-enhancing public investment could improve future 
growth potential, we have examined the interaction between central bank transparency and fiscal 
policy and the resulting effects on macroeconomic performance and volatility. In the framework 
of the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the government is the first mover and the central bank the 
follower, we have shown that the effects of central bank’s opacity (or lack of transparency) 
depend on the marginal effect of public investment.  
In the benchmark case (without productivity-enhancing public investment), central bank’s 
opacity reduces the inflation rate, tax rate, public consumption and output distortions when the 
direct effect of opacity is dominated by the fiscal disciplining effect of opacity. The latter 
condition is verified when the weight assigned to the public consumption is low enough, the 
central bank is quite populist, and the initial degree of opacity is high enough. We have 
demonstrated that the government’s optimal choice of tax rate and public investment, when the 
public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, eliminate the effects of distortionary taxation 
and fully counterbalance both the direct and the fiscal-disciplining effects of opacity at the level 
and variability of inflation and output gap.  
However, in the intermediate cases, where the public investment is insufficiently or relatively 
productivity-enhancing, the effects of opacity would be between these predicted by the 
benchmark model. Even though the effects of opacity on the macroeconomic performance and 
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volatility could be weakened by the productivity-enhancing effects of public investment, the 
implications of the benchmark case, regarding the effects of opacity, will be valid again.  
 
Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 9a and 9b 
Denote the solutions in the benchmark case with a super index “b”, the first corner solutions with 
a super index “fc” and the second-case corner solutions with a super index “sc”. The parameter  
ψ  is also indexed so that we have in the first-case of corner solutions 
i
cicc
i
c
g
ggggsc
g
g
0
20
2
11
0
1
2
4)( ++<<ψ , which can be decomposed as 010 >− cisc ggψ  and 
0210
2 <−− ccscisc ggg ψψ , where 2scψ   stands for 2)( scψ  , and we have in the second case of 
corner solutions, 010 <− cifc ggψ . Furthermore, we have 0>− fcsc ψψ . 
Part I: Second case of corner solutions versus the benchmark case 
Comparing the second-case corner solutions (54)-(61) with the benchmark solutions (13)-(16), 
and using the condition i
cicc
i
c
g
ggggsc
g
g
0
20
2
11
0
1
2
4)( ++<<ψ , we obtain:   
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Part II: Second case of corner solutions versus the first case 
Solutions (40)-(45) and (54)-(61) are indexed according to the aforementioned conventions. 
Comparing them yields: 
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Using 010 <− cifc ggψ  and 0>− fcsc ψψ , we obtain 01csc1 >− cfcgg , 011 <− fcsc ππ  and 
011 >− fcsc xx  if sc
G
fcscisc
G
ifcc
c gggg ψβ
ψψψβψ )()( 0201
2
−+−<  and vice versa.  ■ 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 10b. 
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μδ δμμμδ >+ +++ 1 1
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2
1
2
1
μμ
δμμδδ + +−+> , the only case possible is that these derivatives are 
positive due to the upper bound on the initial degree of opacity, i.e. μσε ≤2  (see the proof of 
Proposition 3).  
The variance of inflation and the output gap in period 1, given by (63), is greater (smaller) 
than the one given by (17) in the benchmark case if igc gg
G
c
0
2
2
1 ψψβ +>  (if 
igcci gggg
G
c
0
2
210
2 1 ψψψ ψβ +<<− , respectively). The variance of inflation and the output gap in 
period 2, given by (64), is smaller than that given by (17).  ■ 
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